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Abstract 
This article illustrates a strategy for representing and analyzing narratives as networks. The 
strategy that we use considers narrative sequences as networks. Elements are treated as nodes 
which are connected by narrative clauses, represented by arcs. By representing complex event 
sequences as networks, inducing 'narrative networks', it is possible to observe and measure 
new structural features of narratives. The narratives we focus on are autobiographical 
accounts of becoming, and being, a Nazi. The substantive idea that we develop in this article 
is that the observable narrative structure of life stories can provide insight into the process of 
identity formation. We illustrate our approach to narrative networks by analyzing a single 
story that, in conjunction with the analysis of other stories, yields a set of insights into becom- 
ing and being. © 2000 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
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"A tragedy is impossible without action, but there 
may be one without actors." (Aristotle) 
I. Introduction 
This article illustrates a new, network-based, strategy for representing and analyz- 
ing narrative sequences. While the strategy we develop is applicable for all narra- 
tives, the narrative sequences we focus on for illustration are autobiographical 
accounts (written life stories) of becoming, and being, a Nazi. Life stories, like all 
stories, consist of sets of elements that are woven together (sometimes more and 
sometimes less) into a narrative sequence in order to account for some change in a 
situation, from the beginning of the sequence to the end (Labov and Fanshel, 1977; 
Labov, 1972). Stories accounting for events or outcomes are necessarily common in 
everyday life, for people construct stories to account for non-canonical events that 
cannot otherwise be accounted for by culturally agreed upon narrative xpectations.l 
Telling stories always involves arraying elements elected from a rich and inex- 
haustible plate of cultural goods - people, places, things, events, ideas, and so on - 
into narrative sequences that are oriented toward a particular end, in such a way as 
to make up what we typically call a 'plot'. 
Narratives provide one mechanism for organizing and generating social meanings. 
The salient social meaning generated in life stories is the identity that the story 
yields. The specific idea that we develop in this article is that network representation 
of the narrative structure of life stories provides insight into the process of identity 
formation. The general idea is that network representation f narrative sequences 
provides insight into the social meanings generated within narratives as a whole. Our 
specific substantive goal is to explore some of the pathways through which ordinary 
men and women became Nazis before the seizure of power. In somewhat fancier 
terms, in this article, we model the construction of Nazi identity, for early adherents 
of the movement. The strategy that we use considers narrative sequences of elements 
1 We are not suggesting that the method we develop here is applicable only to odd stories. By non- 
canonical we do not mean pathological or disturbed. Canonical expectations are the fundamental expec- 
tations that organize our experience. These expectations tend to be extremely simple. One example is the 
'continuity principle' that governs our daily experiences. The continuity principle (as canonical expecta- 
tion) asserts, for example, that when driving, our car will continue to go down the road, that empty 
spaces behind and in front of us will not suddenly become full of things, and that the road behind us will 
stay behind us even after we have driven past it, as will the road in front, and so on. It is culturally 
impossible to tell stories in which all of the elements are organized by canonical expectation; for exam- 
ple, 'I went for a walk and after I put my left foot down ! put my right foot down and then my left foot 
down and ... And when I turned around the path that I had been walking on was still there' is only a 
promising beginning of a story if a non-canonical event (the path disappeared, for example) around 
which a story could be organized is introduced. Abstracted to life stories, there is a more general point. 
Life stories are accounts of how we became who we are. Once it becomes possible to tell a life-story, the 
account hat is told cannot by definition be canonical, e.g. the life lived is the inexorable byproduct of 
the canonical way of life, for example, the life of the peasant for whom death is meaningful. Life-stories 
are consequently a hallmark of modernism. 
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as networks. Elements are treated as nodes which are connected by narrative clauses, 
represented by arcs. 2 By representing complex event sequences as networks, we are 
easily able to observe and measure structural features of narratives that may other- 
wise be difficult to see. There are good reasons to think that insight into the structure 
of narrative processes may be revealed by network methods that provide insight into 
social structure. One simple reason is that narrative data and 'network data' have 
many obvious similarities. Specifically, narrative, historical, and network data are 
locally dense, often cyclic, knotted, and characterized by a redundancy of ties. These 
similarities uggest that the analysis of narratives and event sequences using network 
methods may provide a promising avenue for analysis. Illustration of simple network 
applications to narrative sequences i a goal of this article. 
By 'narrative network', we refer to a strategy for representing narrative life his- 
tories as networks of elements. Applying standard network techniques to this rep- 
resentation of the narrative, we are able to identify some core elements of the 
process by which individuals became Nazis (hereafter, becoming). Though our sub- 
stantive mphasis is on becoming, our data also allow us to consider the narrative 
structure associated with being a Nazi, and to contrast becoming with being more 
generally. 
2. Overview 
While the method we develop is applicable to all narratives, we are especially 
interested in considering how the analysis of narrative networks can contribute to 
solving substantive problems in historical social science. The substantive problem 
we consider in this article is how seemingly ordinary people became Nazis. The 
more standard framing in the social sciences is to ask why people became Nazis, 
thereby ignoring the becoming process. The focus on narrative networks enables one 
to simultaneously consider issues of content (why) and issues of form and process 
(how). The problem posed by the early adherents of the Nazi movement - the peo- 
ple who made the seizure of power possible - is that the process of becoming a Nazi 
reveals that the twin foundations upon which traditional answers to the 'why' ques- 
tion are based (interests and/or social relations) are analytically fragile. 
Against this background, we begin by briefly discussing traditional approaches to 
the problem of accounting for social action in historical sociology. We then describe 
our method in more detail. We illustrate our approach to narrative networks by ana- 
lyzing a single story that, in conjunction with the analysis of other stories, yields a 
set of insights into becoming, and being. Our analyses exploit simple network mea- 
sures that take us down a picaresque narrative river. On the way, we illustrate new 
strategies for analyzing narrative sequences, and point to interesting insights that 
2 A narrative clause is a clause that is temporally ordered in such a way as moving it involves chang- 
ing the meaning of the sub-sequence in which it is embedded. Free clauses, by contrast, can be moved 
without changing the meaning of a sub-sequence, or the narrative as a whole. Stories contain both free 
and narrative clauses (Labov, 1972). 
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arise from each strategy) We show that narratives accounting for the processes of 
becoming have an identifiable structure that is absent in accounts of being. We con- 
clude by discussing how the central methodology developed in this article can be uti- 
lized to analyze narratives of diverse scope, not limited to life-stories. 
3. Data and historical context 
The specific process we consider, becoming a Nazi, is an important one. At the 
most fundamental level, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) 
was able to seize power in Germany because a significant number (around 250,000) 
of otherwise ordinary German people had, before the seizure of power, come to see 
themselves a Nazis. That is, large numbers of Germans omehow took on (and, also 
constructed for others) a Nazi identity. After the seizure of power, becoming a Nazi 
often appeared to be a pragmatic thing to do, and perhaps it was. But before 1930, 
becoming a Nazi was non-normative. It was not pragmatic, it involved high costs 
and high risks, and it was not a routine vent. 
The set of life stories from which we draw our data were written in August 1934 
(just a year after the NSDAP consolidated power, and before widespread knowledge 
of the final solution), by people who joined the movement before the seizure of 
power, typically before 1930 and often earlier. The stories were submitted in a con- 
test for the best life story of an adherent of the Nazi movement. 4 The competition 
was organized by Theodore Abel (a sociologist at Columbia University), but spon- 
sored by the NSDAP and SA. A cash award was to be given to the best essayist. 
Some of the authors who contributed stories were likely trying to win the competi- 
tion for money; others may have wanted to win favor with their superiors. Roughly 
600 stories were entered into the competition. Most of the authors joined the move- 
ment before 1930, when there were few Nazis (in fact, the contest participants rep- 
resent a 1/400 sample of early party members, Merkl, 1977). These men and women 
were not the leaders of the movement, but they were important players. Many rose 
to fill positions of considerable importance as group leaders, party officials or dis- 
3 We are a long way from an integrated theory of becoming and being that would allow us to straighten 
out the curves in the river. Here we are content to see them. 
4 Others have used the stories we work with (Abel, 1938; Merkl, 1977; Rhodes, 1980). Merkl focuses 
on the composition of the movement. His methodological strategy is standard fare in historical sociol- 
ogy; attributes of individuals; SES, religion, age, education, and the like, are extracted from narrative. 
The fact that an author happens not to mention their schooling, family life, religion and so on, are treated 
as missing data. Merkl's analysis rests on crosstabulations of disembodied attributes. Real lives are lost 
in the process, and real process is lost in the movement away from narrative by this abstraction. The role 
of narrative is reduced to local color that serves to flavor the otherwise tasteless cut and paste job that 
this method implies. In contrast, Rhodes works on the stories directly, but without a method, he gets 
trapped in a rhetorical element of stories of becoming fate. Seduced by the fatedness of the narratives, a 
characteristic of teleological thought and a feature of life stories (the work of a story is the revelation that 
'accidents and chance' are only accidents and chance when seen in isolation), Rhodes interprets he Nazi 
movement as fated mysticism, as a millenarianism. Unable to penetrate beneath the rhetoric of fate to 
yield pattern in the process of becoming, Rhodes is lost in the teleology. 
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trict heads (Merkl, 1977; Kater, 1983). The Nazi movement depended on these early 
joiners. Their activities and contributions carried the party beyond shifting attention 
cycles and electoral downswings, they prepared the ground for others to join, and 
thus ultimately they contributed to the seizure of power. In short, the actions of the 
early NSDAP members made possible the Third Reich. There is much to be gained 
from understanding how these people came to see themselves (and be) as Nazis. 
Similar dynamic becoming processes are also likely to operate in other contexts in 
which individuals adopt revolutionary identities that prescribe this worldly action in 
pursuit of movement goals, as well as for more mundane conversion arratives and 
the narratives of adherents of Alcoholics Anonymous. 
4. Theoretical orientation: Narratives and historical social science 
A central problem in historical sociology, and historical social science more gen- 
erally, is what constitutes a plausible account of human action in historical context. 
In general, social scientists work with two often (but not necessarily) competing 
accounts of human action. The first type of account rests on interests that actors 
have, the second rests on actors' sense of sel l  or identity. Both accounts (as well as 
accounts that combine the two frameworks) provide theoretical models for bridging 
the gap between individual characteristics and observed social behavior. Both 
accounts eek to answer the question of 'why' people do things. For some problems 
in historical sociology, these strategies may provide a partial foundation for under- 
standing, although we do not believe fully adequate answers to why questions (with 
respect o motive and/or content) are possible without understanding interest and 
identity formation processes. 
Accounts of action based on interest assume that actors act with purpose to 
advance their interests given the information that they have. Interests are associated 
with positions in civil society, and people who occupy such positions are assigned 
the interests that are associated with them. 5If actors act in accordance with the inter- 
ests they have been assigned, then they are 'rational actors'. With respect o the 
NSDAP, this strategy has led to a number of findings in the literature, for example 
the finding that members of the petty-bourgeoisie w re 'rationally' supporters of the 
NSDAP (Brustein, 1996). The general problem with this approach is that because the 
future conditions the meaning of the past, ex post  outcomes only come to be associ- 
ated with presumed ex ante motivations at the end of behavior sequence. Only by 
ignoring this problem can one consider interest-based analytic strategies to con- 
tribute to our understanding of the meaning of an event sequence. For our case, the 
specific shortcoming is more prosaic: the process of becoming a Nazi involved the 
negation of interests - at least the negation of interests conventionally understood as 
5 Of course they may not 'have' these interests, orif they 'have' them they may not recognize them. 
Consequently hey will not act purposefully with respect to them. But this is the 'testable' component of 
the theoretical model. If one can construct interests hat ex post could be seen to lie behind behavior, the 
imputation ofmotive (e.g. interest) as a plausible account isconfirmed. 
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arising from structural positions in civil society, and hence stands in an uneasy, per- 
haps orthogonal, relationship to interest-based theories. 
Alternatively, a number of sociologists have recently focused on the relationship 
between identity and social action. Because individuals associate with persons who 
are similar to them, individuals tend to be embedded in relatively dense clusters of 
social relations in which the values that they hold and their sense of self are shared 
by and shaped by the others with whom they interact. Consequently, social sources 
of identity are seen to play a critical role in shaping action. 6Relational identity mod- 
els bridge the gap between social relations and action through explicit or implicit ref- 
erence to homophily, v This strategy presumes that social relations meaningfully con- 
stitute identity. To solve endogeneity problems, ex post  imputation of ex ante  
conditions is always necessary. Equally problematic, operationalizing identity as 
relational presumes that all identities are produced and sustained within interacting 
relational networks. This is not necessarily the case, 8and it is not the case for the 
becoming process we describe below. 
Neither interest nor relational identity (nor fusion) models provide a way to bridge 
the gap between individual characteristics ( een in terms of group membership 
and/or relational embedding) and observed action aside from ex post  imputation of 
motive. In this article we propose a simple strategy for bridging this gap directly. 
This strategy works without imputation of motive, and without recourse to abstrac- 
tions that propose independent and largely non-measurable effects of 'culture', 
'symbolic constructions', or 'cultural agencies' (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994). 
6 For example, Paul Willis shows in Learning to labour (1977) how patterns of association amongst a
group of working class youth generate and reproduce cultural commitments tomanual abor. Similarly, 
Traugott (1986) shows how patterns of residential integration by social class in French cities blocked 
possibilities for neighborhood-based working class movements, whereas Gould (1995) shows how 
neighborhood solidarity facilitated some forms of collective action while blocking others. In these mod- 
els, social identity is revealed though homophily within groups on some 'content'. 
7 The classical example of the difference between interest and identity is Marx's (1963) analysis of 
peasants, who share objective interests (class-in-itself) but not self-conscious identity (class-for-itself). 
Bearman's (1993) fusion model shows how biockmodels of social relations imultaneously realize both 
interest and identity to predict social action. Blocks of structurally equivalent actors share the same set 
of interests. When such blocks are also 1-blocks (e.g., are tightly clustered in cohesive interacting sub- 
groups) they also reveal self-conscious identity arising from homophily. Blockmodels provide one 
method for revealing when interests and identity overlap to make possible self-conscious purposive 
social action. In this model, the gap between interest and action is reduced by introduction of an inter- 
vening variable (social identity). Bearman (1993) argues that the identity-action gap is bridged by prac- 
tice. Similarly, Bourdieu (1990) argues for the importance of habitus, a concept that expresses the simul- 
taneity of practice and identity. 
8 Anderson (1991) also argues that identities can emerge that are independent of tangible social rela- 
tions, constituting forms of imagined communities. Often, for example, these are expressed as national- 
ism. Relational models of identity can, however, satisfactorily account for such identities, replacing ties 
between persons, with ties between persons and symbols. Sophisticated network models allow for joint 
visualization of symbolic and tangible networks, using lattice representations (Mische and Pattison. 
1999; Mohr and Duquenne, 1998). Yet these representations, while descriptively powerful, fail to pro- 
vide a mechanism by which the symbolic attachments of individuals are translated into action. However 
one conceives of identity as tangibly constructed through patterns of association (between persons or 
values or ideas), the gap between identity and action remains. 
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Our strategy makes use of actors' narrative accounts of their own becoming experi- 
ences. We represent actors' theories of the self as narrative networks, and show that 
patterns in these accounts reveal an underlying process of 'becoming', thereby pro- 
viding insight into the mechanisms by which identity as a social actor is produced. 
The position and role of elements reveal motive endogenously, in the narrative 
sequence of elements that make up a life s tory .  9 The example we use involves iden- 
tity formation (becoming and being a Nazi) but the method is theoretically applica- 
ble to a wide range of narrative sequences. 
5. Identity production and life-stories 
By identity, we refer to a subjectively held sense of self as an actor in the world 
that gives rise to action which is expressive of, and constituted by, the identity that 
underlies it. In most instances, identity is attached to settings, to particular others (as 
role complements), and to contexts. The identity formation process is typically the 
product of the accretion of relationships. Its narrative account is consequently an 
account in which elements (relations, persons, settings) are drawn to an emergent 
'self', like iron filings under magnetic influence. Here we are interested in the 
process by which a specific form of identity - what we call a master identity - is 
produced. By a master identity we mean an identity that gives rise to action which is 
insensitive to context. Everyday identities give rise to action that expresses, and is 
constructed through, its relational basis. It is a poor father who acts as a scientist to 
his children. The adoption of a master identity means that action, not the 
relation~action pair provides the basis for identity, l° Since the master identity is 
insensitive to others, it cannot be built from relationality with others. The master 
identity's insensitivity to relational context means that it is potentially revolutionary 
if directed towards this-worldly activity. ~1 The specific problem we confront is mod- 
eling the process of becoming when it operates through the elision of social rela- 
tions, as is necessarily the case with master identity formation. 
9 Just because we model authors' accounts does not mean that we are restricted to representation f
these accounts as revelatory of the motive that they explicitly articulate. Our argument is that narrative 
structures reveal motive - even if authors are blind to the underlying process or do not have the capac- 
ity to theorize the becoming process explicitly. 
~o Some examples may help. Alcoholics (those who have gone through AA, and so consider them- 
selves alcoholics) are alcoholics in all their social relations (Cain, 1987). Flagellants beat themselves 
whether anyone is watching or not as an enactment of the millennium. The action-set of Puritans is the 
same whether the relation acted on is a 'father' relation or an 'acquaintance' relation. 
ii The Nazi identity is the most frightening of the master identities that have emerged in the 20 th cen- 
tury. As with other master identities, achievement of one results in a totalization of self and an empti- 
ness of self as well (Arendt, 1973). The self is empty of the usual relational markers of distinction that 
we have - our roles as fathers or husbands or mothers or workers and whatnot. For these roles are nec- 
essarily tied to discrete particular individuals and carry discrete and different obligations and action- 
sets. People with a master identity are empty in the sense that their self acts independently of specific 
others. 
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How then, do identities, and master identities specifically, become constitutive of 
individuals? As suggested above, in order to answer the how question - the process 
question - we need different kinds of  data that allow different orienting questions 
than those typically posed in sociological theories of  action. A basic requirement is
that our data structures must be longitudinal (though they need not be prospective). 
That is, they must be capable of  revealing process. A more fundamental requirement 
is that our data reflect the elements that organize the process, as versus those 
selected from the analyst's hat. One source of  data that meet both requirements are 
life stories. Life stories provide an 'endogenous'  account of  how authors got from 
'there' to where they are. Just like theories, life stories organize facts (elements, 
states, events, etc) into interpretable sequences and patterns to reveal a process. ~2 
Here we focus on this process. 
6. Analytic strategy 
The foundation of our analytic strategy rests on representing life stories - the tex- 
tual narrative accounts of  how early adherents became Nazis - as networks. This is 
accomplished by coding as a node every discrete element within the narrative and 
then representing the author's explicit connections between elements (narrative 
clauses) as arcs linking elements. Arcs between elements are coded as present if one 
element 'leads to' another. For example, one section of the story we focus on here 
describes the significance of receiving a pair of  brown trousers: 
'When I was sixteen years old my mother bought me some brown trousers. If she had known the signif- 
icance of this color, she would never have bought hem for me. I told her that they pleased me, and she 
also bought some for my brother ... Now I felt as though I were half a Nazi.' 
Our coding isolates the discrete elements of  the story, in this case, identifying 
events like the purchase of  the trousers, that they pleased him, that he told his mother 
that, that she then bought some for his brother, and that he 'felt like half a Nazi '  as 
unique narrative lements, or nodes. Links between nodes are those present in narra- 
tive time they are the connections, or imputations, made by the author in putting the 
story together. A sociometric graph representing this narrative sub-sequence is 
shown in Fig. 1. The narrative complexity of  this episode is revealed by the knotty 
and overlapping pattern of links connecting the discrete nodes. 
t2 The revelation of facts does not guarantee that the facts will be indicative of a reality exogenous to 
the life story. Sociologists who have used life stories as data tend to deny this, but it is a mistake to imag- 
ine that jumping out of the narrative isa trivial sort of exercise. Assuming that life stories reveal a mean- 
ingful external reality, sociologists tend to ignore the story and focus on the life external to the story 
(Elder, 1974; Clausen, 1993; Peacock, 1986). This strategy embraces the weaknesses ofstories and runs 
from their strengths. The strength of stories is that they are accounts of process. Cf. Bruner, who notes 
that "the second feature of narrative is that it can be real or imaginary without loss of its power as a 
story. The sense and the reference of a story bear an anomalous relationship to each other. That narra- 
tive is indifferent to extra-lingusitic reality underlines the fact that it has a structure that is internal to dis- 
course" (Bruner, 1986: 44). 
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Fig. 1. Graph representation of subsection fnarrative network. 
We use the technique of identifying nodes and arcs to code the entire story, gen- 
erating an adjacency matrix denoting the ties between elements within each story. 
From each matrix we induce graphs that represent the narrative from which they 
arose: the complete graph associated with the story we rely on for our illustration is 
shown in Fig. 2. As we conceive them, graph representations are isomorphic with the 
narrative, and it is possible to reconstruct the original life story from the graph. 13 
Event sub-sequences with dense and complex inter-relationships between elements 
appear as knots, simpler narrative sequences with less causal density appear as 
chains. The absence of narrative connections between elements is indicated by an 
absence of arcs. The graph suppresses real time if the causal narrative suppresses 
real time. In real time, the graph reported in Fig. 2 describes events from 1916, when 
the author was five years old, to 1934, when the author (at age 23) wrote his life 
story. Between 1916 and 1930 (the becoming portion), the story consists of 139 
unique identifiable narrative lements; between 1930 and 1934 (the being portion), 
the story contains 142 unique narrative lements. There is no necessary relationship 
between element frequency, sub-sequence d nsity, and real time. Our representation 
of narratives as networks relies solely on narrative time. 
7. Structural features of graphs: Contrasting the becoming and being narra- 
tives 
Representing narratives as networks allows one to identify obvious patterns in the 
structure of narratives. The graph represented in Fig. 2 reveals two different struc- 
tures, here highlighted by shading. The left half of the life story, associated with the 
author's account of becoming a Nazi, is knotty and densely tied. The right half, asso- 
ciated with being a Nazi, is composed of small and disjointed components (narrative 
sub-sequences). In the becoming narrative, all elements are tied to at least one other 
t3 Our representations involve a compromise b tween three different principles: narrative time should 
flow from left to right, elements close to one another in the causal narrative should be close to one 
another in the graph, and the number of crossing lines should be minimized, but this is simply to aid in 
interpretation. 





O elements in becoming story (~) elements in being story 
Fig. 2. Narrative structure ofnazi life history. 
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node: not a single element is a pure isolate. This is in sharp contrast o the being nar- 
rative, in which 27% of all nodes (n = 34) have no tie to any other node. These visual 
impressions are conf irmed by comparing the density of  the two parts of  the narra- 
tive: the becoming narrative is twice as dense as the being narrative.14 
Narrative density is the product of  the theory of  the l ife-story. The absence of  
connections between elements or sub-sequences implies the absence of  theory, or 
plot. 15 The being story is the denouement of  the becoming process, yet it is not the 
case that we should expect the absence of  narrative density, for authors of  stories 
select the elements that they work with on the basis of  an organizing theory. These 
elements hould compose sub-sequences of loosely coupled events, unless the theory 
governing the selection of  events is decoupled from the narrative account. We return 
to the signif icance of  this decoupl ing further below. 
The formal component structure of  each half  of  the story is shown in Fig. 3.16 The 
becoming narrative is dominated by one large component of  116 inter-connected 
events. Two relatively small components (nodes 117-122; and nodes 124-128) 
towards the end of  the becoming narrative are disconnected from the becoming 
process. 17 A few small components at the start of  the story are also disconnected 
from the large component.  18In contrast, the being story is dominated by isolated 
events and extremely small components;  it is impossible to travel through the being 
story from its beginning to end. The absence of  connective structure in the being 
story makes meaningless many standard social network analysis techniques, 19which 
capture the heterogeneity of  nodes with respect o their posit ion in the overall  net- 
work. 
14 The narrative of becoming has a density of 0.0174 (n of nodes = 139) while the being narrative has 
a density of 0.0093 (n of nodes = 142). 
15 Parsimonious theories will yield thin connected graphs like spanning trees. Complex theories will 
lead to cycles and cores; the absence of an organizing theory will lead to isolated nodes. Therefore the 
overall relationship between density and theory is curvilinear. 
16 Technically, a component is a complete set of nodes tied by arcs in a graph. If all nodes in a graph 
are connected, the graph contains a single component. 
~7 These two subsequences involve school. In the first, the author sees a NSDAP parade while at 
school, and describes the attitudes of his teacher (SPD), other students, and his courses. Despite the fact 
that his German teacher was SPD, he liked German the best of all his subjects. In the second sequence 
(124-128), the author tries to leave school for the first time and is threatened by his father. Subsequently, 
he leaves chool anyway and achieves an inner clarity that connects him to dead soldiers and the father- 
land. 
~8 These events involve Jews. The author has a number of experiences with Jews. He integrates one set 
of experiences (fighting Jews after getting his brown pants), but fails to integrate other experiences (a 
Jew gives him sweets, but he never eats them), and his brother dies after an 'unnecessary operation' con- 
ducted by a Jewish doctor. In other narratives Jews and relations with Jews, also tend to have low cen- 
trality and be in smaller disjoint components. 
19 For example, it is impossible to induce a meaningful role structure of the elements in the being story. 
Likewise, many measures of central graph tendencies (centralization, for example) while calculable, are 
not helpful. 
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Component Size 
o 1 
e----~° 2 1 (2%) 
. . . .  o 3 1 (2%) 
Frequency 
Part I Part II 
Becoming Being 
0 (0%) 34 (24%) 
8(11%) 
8 (17%) 
o~- e.~---e~-e 4 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 
.~o-~® 5 1 (4%) 2 (7%) 
~ "° 
o-----~°'--~ *'o 6 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 
~00 . ~ ~  7 1(4%) 2(10%) 
t ~ [  10-20 0 (0%) 2 (21%) 
1 (83%) 0 (0%) 
o ~  9 ~ 116 
Fig. 3. Distribution ofn-sized components in narrative. 
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It is possible, though, to think about narrative depth as a meaningful structural fea- 
ture of narrative networks. The simplest measure of narrative depth is the length of 
the shortest direct path from the beginning of a component tothe end. In the becom- 
ing story, the longest shortest path (geodesic) involves 23 steps. The fact that he most 
'efficient' becoming pathway, the core of the process, involves 23 ordered elements 
ordered by narrative clauses makes clear that he becoming stories we focus on are not 
simple. In contrast, in the being story, the longest shortest path (which is embedded 
in the largest sub-component) involves 7 steps. Focusing on geodesic pathways sug- 
gests ome new ways to conceptualize structural narrativity beyond irect element-to- 
element ties, specifically by identifying the core elements in the becoming process, 
elements which, if removed, would break the underlying plot into disjoint stories. 
Fig. 4 reveals the necessary structural features of the becoming narrative by 
removing nodes (elements) that stand between two other elements in a single chain. 
Thus, for example, the chain 1---~2--~17 is simplified through betweenness reduction 
to 1 ~ 17, eliminating the element '2' (going into the cellar to avoid bombs during 
the great war). In both halves of the narrative, roughly half of the events can be elim- 
inated as fully redundant (72/139 vs. 69/142). Reduction of the becoming story 
yields a parsimonious representation f a single cohesive story. In contrast, reduction 
highlights the disjunctive nature of the being story. 
While narratively redundant, events that are embedded in dense sub-sequences 
tend to have greater in and out degree (the number of other events that they are tied 
to). If one thinks of narrative as carrying all of the events of the related past into the 
future (both the direct tie representation f Fig. 2 and the reduced form narrative 
structure reported in Fig. 4 ignore all of the relations between elements that are 
implied by their carrying capacity), densely tied events have greater indirect reach. 
That is, they provide indirect connections between elements in a narrative, even 
above and beyond their immediate structural position. 
Contrast between the structure of the first and second halves of the story is 
revealed most starkly by focusing on the proportion of all elements reached through 
indirect pathways in n-steps. Fig. 5 illustrates this contrast. The x-axis indexes the 
number of steps, and the y-axis indexes the proportion of all elements drawn into the 
narrative at each remove. For each element, we calculate the total number of ele- 
ments reached through chains of intermediary elements, and report he mean number 
reached. Because the being story lacks a theory (self) to link elements, no more than 
15% of all elements are connected even under maximum narrativity, where the entire 
past is drawn into the future (and vice-versa). 
The thinness of the being story is revealed under conditions of maximum connec- 
tivity implied by our focus on all the indirect connections between elements. The 
structure of the reach distribution - in this case, where we observe that more than 1/2 
of all elements in the becoming story can be reached with very few steps - provides 
insight into the dynamics of the becoming process. Here, as in all examples we have 
worked with, locally dense event sequences characterized by cyclical and knotted 
element-to- element relations are connected through bridge events. In the next sec- 
tion we focus on these bridge events, first with respect o their type, and subse- 
quently with respect to their content. 
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? ] l 
Narrative Time 
• elements in becoming story O elements in being story 
Fig. 4. Reduced form of entire life history. 










0.1 ~ ~ 
0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
n of steps 
Fig. 5. Mean fraction of elements reached at n-steps. 
8. Types of elements 
Structural nalysis of narrative networks allows for measurement of narrative char- 
acteristics independent of element content. In this section we illustrate how integrat- 
ing structural properties of elements (centrality, betweenness, patterning of dyadic 
ties) with content allows for new insight into the meaning of elements, ub-sequences, 
and the narrative as a whole. The goal is to reveal an underlying morphology to nar- 
rative processes of becoming (and, where possible, being) a Nazi. The first problem 
to resolve is that the specific elements invoked in life-stories are heterogeneous. 
Comparison within and across narratives necessitates abstraction away from the par- 
ticularity of specific elements. This is accomplished by grouping elements into 
equivalency classes. Here we define elements with respect to type and content. 
We first distinguish between three classes of elements by type: macrolevel ele- 
ments (M), local event elements (L), and cognitions (C). Macro-level elements are 
elements noted in the narrative that occur outside the author's local world. In this 
narrative, macro-level lements include the 'great war', the putsch, and rising infla- 
tion. Local event elements are ordinary events occurring in the author's local world. 
These are events that are experienced directly. In our illustrative story local elements 
include experiencing a childhood illness, wearing a swastika to school, and taking a 
bicycle trip with his sister. Cognitions are aspects of the narrative in which the 
author questions the meanings of elements, draws conclusions, or reveals anew cog- 
nitive understanding about his situation. Cognition elements include 'communists 
and Hitler both want power', 'recognizes the beauty of nature', and 'felt as if half a 
Nazi'. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive characteristics of narrative 
Being (Part II) Becoming (Part I) Entire narrative 
Type of node n % n % n % 
Macro elements (M) 6 4 12 8 18 6 
Local elements (L) 99 71 94 66 193 67 
Cognitive lements (C) 34 18 36 25 70 25 
N of Nodes 139 142 281 
Overall, macrolevel elements are rarely mentioned in the story (only 6.4% of ele- 
ments are classified as macro-level elements). Inclusion of these events, while not dri- 
ving the story itself, locates the narrative of becoming in real time. The bulk of the 
narrative is composed of local events, which are relatively evenly distributed across 
the two halves of the narrative (71% in part I; 66% in part II). These events are the 
goods that authors work with in constructing narratives. These particular local events, 
identified as salient enough to be included in a narrative, are selected from the 
immense universe of local incidents that all persons encounter. Like local events, cog- 
nitive events are evenly distributed between the becoming story and the being story, 
constituting about 25% of all elements. The composition of the becoming and being 
stories is similar. What differs is the structure built out of these raw materials. 2°
9. Dyadic structure: Pattern across types of elements 
We begin by examining the dyadic structure of narrative links between types of 
elements. Table 2 reports the frequency of ties between elements of different ypes 
in each part of the narrative. Though the becoming story is twice as dense as the 
being story, the pattern of linkages between types of elements is in some respects 
similar in the two parts of the narrative. 
While sharing some patterns, there are important differences between the two 
halves of the story. The most notable deviation is the role cognitions play in the two 
parts of the story. In the becoming story, cognitions are almost equally likely to send 
ties as to receive them (send-receive ratio = 0.86), while in the being story, cogni- 
tions are almost always the consequence of a prior element (send-receive ratio = 
0.16). Substantively, this reveals that cognitions play a crucial role in motivating the 
narrative of becoming. The cognitive labor of linking otherwise unrelated elements 
together is the hallmark of a narrative of identity formation. In the absence of cogni- 
tive glue, narrativity breaks down, as we observe in the narrative description of 
being a Nazi. 
2o The goods that authors have to work with are roughly comparable. Meaning is derived from the way 
these goods are arrayed into a narrative and analyzed as a narrative network. 
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Table 2 
Network characteristics 
Becoming (Part I) Being (Part II) Entire Narrative 
Types of ties n % n % n % 
M- L 7 4 8 8 15 6 
M- C 1 1 8 8 9 3 
L - L 91 55 49 53 140 54 
L - C 36 22 23 25 59 23 
C - L 14 8 0 0 14 5 
C - C 18 11 5 5 23 9 
N of ties 167 93 260 
Overall density 0.0174 0.0093 0.0066 
Cognitions are densely interconnected with one another and with actual events. 
The production of cognitions appears to define sequences of actual events, and some 
cognitions reappear as the cause of subsequent action. This pattern is not replicated 
at all in the being narrative, where cognitions are relatively isolated from local 
events, and are never reflected back into the realm of action (i.e., into nodes coded 
as local event elements). Being a Nazi induces the absence of self-reflexivity. 
Treating the narrative as a network reveals that though the same kinds of goods 
are used at the same frequency in each half of the story, how these goods get orga- 
nized into narrative differs radically. The becoming narrative is a narrative because 
cognitions bridge event sub-sequences, driving the author to conceive of himself as 
a Nazi. In the being story, cognitions never bridge events or event sequences. This 
lack of organized connectivity yields a story that is marked by the absence of narra- 
tivity. The absence of narrativity results from the absence of a theory of the self. 
10. Element content in the becoming process 
As discussed earlier, standard life-stories produce their end (the life realized) by 
accretion of specific relational elements to the life-world of the narrator: roles, peo- 
ple, and places (Bruner, 1986). Our analysis of the structure of NSDAP narrative 
networks suggests that the new Nazi self emerges from the elision of social rela- 
tions. The specific mechanism by which social relations are elided is physical 
mobility, The consequence of drifting in a world stripped of social relations is 
increasing commitment to simple cognitive abstractions that order experience into a 
set of binary oppositions and bridge between otherwise disjoint event sequences. The 
first two processes (breakdown and mobility) are characteristic processes associated 
with participation in high-risk and high-cost social movements (cf. biographical 
availability in McAdam, 1988). The latter process (simplification) is characteristic of
radical conversion movements, typically those associated with a withdrawal from 
everyday life (Snow, 1986; Barker, 1984; Lofland and Stark, 1965). The coupling of 
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breakdown and radical abstraction appears to yield the distinctive character of early 
Nazis. 
The best way to measure the importance of particular kinds of events in narrative 
networks is to assess the centrality of nodes associated with them. Central nodes play 
a crucial role in advancing the narrative, because they weave together otherwise 
unconnected components of the story. We use a specific measure of centrality, 
'power centrality', derived by Bonacich (1987), in which the centrality of each ele- 
ment is conditioned by the centrality of the elements it is tied to. In this formulation, 
an element with many ties to peripheral elements i not as central as an element with 
fewer ties to highly central elements. In narrative networks, power centrality cap- 
tures the importance of each element in the plot that is unfolding. 
The characteristic feature of the NSDAP becoming story is decreasing centrality 
of relational elements and traditional bases of identity (e.g., kin, church, school, and 
work) in the narrative of becoming. Ordinary social institutions, and the relations 
that they entail, become less and less central as the narrative progresses. At the start 
of our illustrative narrative, the author still acts in some of these settings he contin- 
ues to see his family, he goes to school but his action becomes oriented elsewhere. 
The narrative sub-sequences a sociated with social roles are stories of rejection. A 
subtext of this narrative is shearing away from the dependencies of childhood and 
adolescence31 Elision and breakdown is the first major theme of becoming. 
The second major theme of the narrative of becoming is mobility. If breakdown 
creates a supply of potential Nazis, mobility operates as a matching mechanism, 
introducing persons to the movement. In the representative story, the nodes and 
sequences concerned with mobility in this narrative are the nodes that contain Nazis. 
This author experiences a great deal of mobility: he travels extensively, and changes 
residences often (nine times in three years). The consequences of his mobility are 
quite evident, since each time he travels, he encounters other Nazis. In short, his 
mobility experiences make possible encounters with NSDAP supporters, all of 
which draw him closer to the movement. Motion facilitates and sustains breakdown. 
The role played by travel and random contact gives the becoming story a flavor of 
chance or fate rather than agency. 
Meaning is attached to the Nazi movement by organizing and resolving reality in 
terms of a series of simplified binary oppositions. In this case, the opposition of 
chaos and order organizes the narrative. By recounting the past in this way, the 
author exposes his own theory of becoming a Nazi, that the Hitler movement offered 
the solution to the chaos he saw everywhere around him. For example, in our illus- 
trative story, one of the author's first thoughts i that nature is beautiful. This is rep- 
21 The same pattern is present in almost all other becoming stories. One woman feels more and more 
like a Nazi as she progressively loses her eldest son, husband, and youngest son. With each loss she is 
drawn closer to the movement. The stories of older adherent's play on the losses experienced after the 
collapse of the war effort, the estrangement from place after the solidarity of the trenches. The story told 
by the author of our illustrative story is not out of the ordinary for a twentieth century outh. Individu- 
als not firmly rooted in family, church, work, school, or other elements of civil society are biographically 
available to totalizing identities (Lofland and Stark, 1965; Stark and Bainbridge, 1979). It is not acci- 
dental that the Nazis attracted the youth of Germany. 
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resented in Fig. 2 as the sequence of nodes 316, which culminates in node 23, the 
recognit ion that nature is beautiful. 22 This love of  nature becomes associated in his 
narrative with order -  with straight rows of  graves in cemeteries - order that is dis- 
t inguished from the chaos of  the republ ican period. 23 
The simpli f icat ion of  the world in terms of  basic opposit ions to which any content 
can be ascribed is the process that unites biographical  avai labi l i ty with the contact 
afforded by mobil i ty.  This unif ication depends on the negation of  particular social 
relations (for s impli f ication rests on denial of  difference), and al lows the author to 
attach meaning to the movement he bumps into. The discovery of  clarity (for this 
author the marker of  being a Nazi) is hence revealed as more than a passive process: 
it rests on three 'microprocesses ' :  breakdown, simplif ication, and motion. 
Table 3 reports the relative centrality of  substantively derived classes of elements 
in the becoming narrative associated with Fig. 2. We consider those elements asso- 
ciated with the micro-processes we have described, and compare their centrality to 
the narrative as a whole and to anti-Semitic omponents.  
Table 3 
Mean centrality and relative centrality of groups of elements 
N of Nodes Chaos Exposure Anti- Order Elision Complete 
to Nazis semitism narrative 
17 6.35 a 0.96 ° 2.19 0.99 0.98 1.21 
13 6.60 2.28 1.02 1.02 1.26 
7 2.90 0.45 0.45 0.55 
9 6.44 0.99 1.23 
12 6.50 1.24 
Chaos 




Complete narrative 139 5.24 
Main diagonal cells report mean Bonacich centrality (beta = 0.2) for elements in group (Bonacich, 
1987). 
b Off-diagonal cells report he ratio of row to column group centrality (e.g., 6.35/6.60) 
The central ity of  exposure to Nazis (the consequence of  mobi l i ty)  deviates most 
markedly from the mean central ity of  the first half  of  the narrative as a whole (ratio 
= 1.26). The ideas of  chaos and order are also signif icantly more central than other 
nodes. El is ion of  social relationships i also signif icantly more central than expected 
22 This recognition happens when the author ecovers from a childhood illness that has left him tem- 
porarily blinded. 
23 Other elements in this process, by way of illustration are described immediately below. For exam- 
ple, when he first sees a parade of 'Hitler men'", (node 59), he compares them to the communists, who 
he has also seen in parades (node 26), and who have plundered his uncle's hop (nodes 30-33). At the 
age of 12, he concludes that while both the communists and Nazis want power, the Hitler men sing beau- 
tifully and march well, and thus wouldn't harm anyone (nodes 71-73). At age 18 he reports that the 
Party fulfilled his 'inner longing for clarity', and that it was 'easy to act according to National Socialist 
ideas' (nodes 134-136), 
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by chance. In this narrative, as in most others, anti-Semitism, while a common con- 
tent, is characterized by low centrality. It is always in the background, but rarely dri- 
ves the narrative. Centrality in a narrative network captures the dual characteristic of
densely embedded nodes and reach. By focusing on centrality, narrative process at 
the level of element context is revealed. This process can, and does, differ from the 
explicit heory proposed by the author, for element centrality may be invisible in the 
unfolding narrative, as the most important nodes are those that bridge sub-sequences. 
While the life history is a theory of becoming, it reveals a process that is analytically 
distinct. The structure of a narrative network provides insight into motive, without 
exogenous imputation. 
11. Discussion 
The methodological goal of this article was to develop and illustrate a set of sim- 
ple network based techniques for the analysis of complex narratives. The strategy we 
develop for working with narratives as networks rests on transforming the content 
elements of narrative (the goods that authors array into a sequence so as to construct 
a story) into nodes, connected by narrative clauses that can be seen as flows. This 
simple transformation allows for graphic representation of complex narratives. 
Because content elements (nodes) and the causal relations between elements (arcs) 
are abstracted from the raw narrative, the network graphs that result are isomorphic 
to the story from which they are drawn. 
The key development is recognition that narratives and social structures have sim- 
ilar features, and that these features provide insight into the social meanings gener- 
ated and reproduced within each. Both are often locally dense (and globally sparse), 
knotty, and redundant. These features of narratives, as with social structures, allow 
for measurement of their structural properties, thereby revealing their morphological 
foundation, and making possible meaningful comparisons, even across narrative 
contents (or structural contexts) that are vastly different in scope and significance. 
This article suggests that understanding this morphological foundation allows for 
new insight into the social meanings generated by narrative. 
A byproduct of such understanding may be a third pathway for historical social 
science. More traditional interest and/or identity based models force analysts to 
impute motive to actors to bridge the gap between observed action and social con- 
text. Narrative network methods allow analysts to systematically utilize new data 
structures (life-stories, populations of interrelated event sequences) without having 
to wrest elements from their narrative context. This makes possible analysis of a new 
set of process-based questions, of which the becoming process discussed in this arti- 
cle is but one example of many. 
In this case, measurement of the structural properties of narrative networks yields 
insight into the distinction between becoming and being. Focusing on the intercala- 
tion of element type and content with structural position reveals underlying narrative 
mechanisms; elision, mobility, and simplification. By reducing complex narratives 
to simpler images, we identify the specific nodes that are essential to the coherence 
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of plot. The method we develop and illustrate in this article allows us to explore both 
structural features of narrative unfolding and the specific impact hat cultural (con- 
tent) elements play in becoming. In this instance, and in other NSDAP narratives, we 
observe the same general process: the Nazi self emerges from the elision of social 
relations through contact with other Nazis. The stories we consider are stories of the 
loss of relational identity. While the authors' theories directed the selection of ele- 
ments to array into their life-stories, none of these authors et out to write stories of 
the loss of self. While narrative network graphs are isomorphic to the text, the mean- 
ing revealed from structural characteristics of the narrative as a whole, and the cen- 
trality and reach of specific elements, need not be the meaning 'intended' by the 
author. Structural similarity across heterogeneous narratives with respect o content 
suggests the presence of similar structural pathways for master-identity formation. 
The structure of the narrative describing being a Nazi almost defies structural 
analysis. We cannot identify process in Fig. 2, for process requires connections, 
imputations, cognitive linking - in short, process requires narrative time, which is 
necessary for narrative clauses. When the process is completed when the author is a 
Nazi - the self disappears. Nothing is left to operate the story, except for a mechan- 
ical agency. This mechanical agency is the agency of a thermometer that in its very 
essence can only tell you the temperature; that is, an agency completely built into its 
being as a thermometer (Burke, 1945), The authors of the stories we consider can 
continue to report the facts, but nothing beyond the facts. This is not because there 
is not a story to tell: they explicitly select facts to tell a story, but it is a banal story 
of action without actors. 
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